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I. INTRODUCTION 
I would first like to pay tribute to my colleague John Sprankling, whose 
ability to identify fascinating topics to research and to produce original and 
significant scholarship is unparalleled in my experience. This ability has led John 
to contribute immeasurably to our knowledge-base in the field of property law, in 
particular, filling gaps that no one else seems to have realized existed. His 
exploration of the International Law of Property, which had not before been 
comprehensively examined—in fact, the expression “international law of 
property” had not been part of the legal vernacular—is such a contribution. It is 
against this background that I venture to make a very small contribution with 
regard to fresh water, the extent to which humans have an inherent right to it, and 
to the extent that they do, what the chances are of such a right actually being 
realized. 
II. FRESH WATER: THE INCREASINGLY SCARCE AND CONTENTIOUS  
SOURCE OF LIFE 
Humans need water to live. We can live considerably longer without food 
than water. Yet the perverse impacts of climate change, as predicted by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the most authoritative 
scientific body on the subject, mean that areas that are already arid will probably 
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become drier.1 More fundamentally, the IPCC reports that “[i]n many regions, 
changing precipitation or melting snow and ice are altering hydrological systems, 
affecting water resources in terms of quantity and quality.”2 If this were not 
enough, the growing human population means that per capita water supplies are 
shrinking globally.3 While significant progress has been made on achieving the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reducing by half “the proportion of the 
population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” 
by 2015,4 as of 2012, there were still some 700 million people without access to 
safe drinking water and a billion without basic sanitation.5 This is a recipe for 
human hardship and lays bare the magnitude of the challenge of guaranteeing a 
human right to water. It is also a recipe for conflict, especially where freshwater 
resources are shared internationally, which is in fact the case for much of the 
world’s fresh water. 
More than 260 of Earth’s drainage basins are international, meaning that two 
or more nations share this number of river and lake systems, along with their 
associated groundwater.6 In Africa alone, every country shares fresh water with 
another country. Eighty-five percent of the fresh water in Africa “comes from 
international rivers.”7 Globally, international basins cover nearly half of Earth’s 
land area and include territory of some 145 countries—a number that may well 
increase as more aquifers are mapped.8 Around forty percent of the world’s 
population lives in these shared catchments.9 
Any perturbation in one of these basins holds the potential for conflict with 
other states in the basin. Such a change of conditions may be caused by natural 
phenomena such as climate change, by human actions such as the construction of 
a dam, or a combination, as when climate change results in lower river flows and 
leads riparian states to divert a higher proportion of water from rivers than they 
had in the past. Such conflicts would raise issues in the field of the law of 
 
1. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2014: Synthesis 
Report (Core Writing Team et al., eds. 2014).  
2. Id. at 6. 
3. The medium scenario of the U.N. World Population Division predicts that the global population will 
top out at some 9 billion people around 2050. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS/POPULATION DIV., 
WORLD POPULATION TO 2300 12 (2004). 
4. U.N. ECON. COMM. FOR EUROPE [UNECE], Millennium Development Goals, Target 7.C, available at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review).  
5. WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNICEF, PROGRESS ON DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION 2014 UPDATE 
(2014). 
6. RICHARD KYLE PAISLEY, FAO TRAINING MANUAL FOR INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES/RIVER 
BASINS INCLUDING LAW, NEGOTIATION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND SIMULATION TRAINING EXERCISES 1 
(2007). 
7. TAKELE SOBOKA BULTO, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN 
AFRICA 255 (2014). 
8. PAISLEY, supra note 6, at 1.  
9. Id. at 9.  
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international watercourses, a branch of public international law. This short paper 
does not address those conflicts, but focuses on the human consequences of 
changes in the availability of fresh water. It will be useful to consider first 
whether these consequences are affected by the extent to which there are property 
rights in water. 
III. WATER RIGHTS AS PROPERTY RIGHTS 
While water was a public good that no one could own under Roman and 
Islamic Law, the water rights systems in the Western United States effectively 
gives those who have made a prior appropriation of fresh water for a beneficial 
use a right in that water that is superior to any claims of others. The water need 
not be used on riparian land, with return flows augmenting quantities in the 
stream from which the water was taken, unlike the system of riparian rights in 
force in the eastern United States. The appropriator may convey the water into a 
wholly different watershed, so long as this is done in connection with beneficial 
uses, such as those for domestic, agricultural, mining, and municipal purposes.10 
Originally, an appropriative right was generally established simply by diverting 
water and applying it to a beneficial use. The date on which this was done was 
the date when the right was established and made the appropriator “senior” to all 
those who came after. The latter “junior” right holders only have a right to 
quantities of water that exceed the amount appropriated by the senior right 
holder. Modern prior-appropriation systems normally require the appropriator to 
obtain a license or similar permit from the competent governmental entity, 
simplifying the determination of the priority date, but otherwise, the legal regime 
has stayed essentially the same. 
Thus under the system of prior appropriation, one could be said to have a 
property right in the water appropriated. This was thought necessary in the arid 
western part of the United States where there was often not sufficient water for 
all claimants. If there was no property right in the water, the thinking went, there 
would be little incentive to make the investment required for the development of 
land or mineral resources; the seminal case in the field arose out of competing 
claims of miners during California’s 1849 gold rush.11 For the same reasons, the 
doctrine was not needed in the well-watered eastern parts of the country where 
there was plenty of water to go around. But at least in the western United States, 
it may be said that individuals may have property rights in water—not only to use 
water, but in the water itself. 
Yet on reflection the expression “property right” appears to be a misnomer 
when applied to water. Water itself is not “property” as that term is generally 
 
10. See the seminal case establishing the doctrine of prior appropriation, Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 
(1855). 
11. Id. 
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understood. This is because of water’s unique qualities. It bears no resemblance 
to Blackacre, real property, or to a Cadillac, personal property. It is certainly not 
intangible, like certain other forms of property. While not intangible, however, it 
is evanescent, in that its molecules are in constant motion, whether through 
evaporation from the surface of a glass of ice-water, or through its movement in 
streams and aquifers. In these and so many other ways, water resists capture and 
is thus unlike the fox in Pierson v. Post that was held to be the property of the 
first taker.12 Rights in water, yes. Rights to use water, yes. But ownership of the 
water itself? Much more doubtful. This is revealed when one considers the 
human right to water. How could this right be guaranteed if not public authorities 
but private actors controlled, owned, the water? Life cannot exist without water, 
and it would be a strangely Orwellian society that entrusted the lives and well-
being of its citizens to private owners of such a vital resource. 
Nevertheless, the notion of water rights presents intriguing possibilities for 
the challenge of ensuring that humans the world over have access to adequate 
quantities of safe, fresh water, or, as the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has put it, that everyone have “sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.”13 
IV. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 
When International Human Rights Law was born in the aftermath of the 
Holocaust and the Second World War, the immediate focus was understandably 
on preventing governments from taking things away from their citizens, 
including their lives, not requiring them to provide things. But, in part because of 
the insistence of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, affirmative duties 
in the economic, social, and cultural sphere were added to the duties of 
abstention regarding civil and political matters. The result was the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1948.14 The rights that this non-binding instrument15 recognized were 
eventually codified in two treaties adopted in 1966: The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (CP Covenant), and the International Covenant on 
 
12. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805). 
13. Comm. on Econ., Social & Cultural Rights, (CESCR), General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water 
(Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment 15].  
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 
1948).  
15. As a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, which is empowered by the U.N. Charter 
only to make “recommendations,” the Universal Declaration itself is non-binding. U..N. Charter art. 10. 
However, it has been argued that the Universal Declaration has come to reflect customary international law. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 701 (1987). 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESC Covenant).16 While the obligation to 
“respect and to ensure” rights in the civil and political domain were of immediate 
effect, those in the economic, social, and cultural field were to be implemented 
progressively.17 Specifically, Article 2, paragraph 1 of the ESC Covenant 
provides as follows: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.18 
This differential treatment of the two categories of human rights makes sense: a 
country should not be permitted to implement progressively fundamental 
obligations such as the one to refrain from extrajudicial killing,19 whereas many 
states would need time to implement the right to “an adequate standard of 
living . . . including adequate food, clothing and housing.”20 
Enter the human right to water. Which covenant establishes this right? It 
might be thought that since water is essential to life, the right to it would be of 
immediate effect, and thus be established by the Civil and Political Covenant.21 
On the other hand, since many developing countries lack the capacity to 
implement such an obligation immediately, a case might be made for the human 
right to water to be subject only to progressive implementation under the 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Covenant.22 But when the two covenants are 
searched for any mention of the human right to water, perhaps surprisingly, one 
comes up empty. Neither covenant refers even obliquely to such a right. In fact, 
one can search literature, U.N. documents, opinions of human rights courts and 
other bodies in vain for any reference to a general human right to water until the 
early 1990s. How can this be? 
In fairness, two treaties, concluded in the 1970s and 1980s, seem to 
contemplate a right to water. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women requires that States ensure that women 
 
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter CP 
Covenant]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter ESC Covenant]. 
17. CP Covenant, supra note 16, at art. 2(1). 
18. ESC Covenant, supra note 16, at art. 2(1). 
19. CP Covenant, supra note 16, at art. 6. 
20. ESC Covenant, supra note 16, at art. 11(1). 
21. CP Covenant, supra note 16. 
22. ESC Covenant, supra note 16. 
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“enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to . . . water supply.”23 
And the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that States combat 
disease and malnutrition “through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and 
clean drinking-water.”24 But neither expressly calls access to water a human 
right.25 
The right to water began to make its way into the literature in the 1990s.26 
And then in 2002, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ESC Committee) adopted a document entitled “General Comment No. 15 
(2002), The Right to Water (Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).”27 As the body overseeing the 
implementation of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
ESC Committee adopts “general comments” concerning the way in which it will 
interpret provisions of that agreement. As indicated by its title, General Comment 
15 serves as notice that the committee will interpret Articles 11 and 12 of the 
ESC Covenant as including a right to water. Article 11, paragraph 1, provides as 
follows: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.”28 
The Committee explained: 
The right to water clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential 
for securing an adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one of 
the most fundamental conditions for survival. Moreover, the Committee 
has previously recognized that water is a human right contained in 
Article 11(1) (see General Comment No. 6). The right to water is also 
inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health (Art. 12(1)) and the rights to adequate housing and adequate food 
(Art. 11(1)).29 
This may seem a rather roundabout way of finding a right to a substance 
without which all other human rights would be pointless. On the other hand, it is 
virtually incontestable that because water, like air, is essential to life, a right to it 
 
23. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 14(2), Dec. 18, 
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
24. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24(2), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
25. See id.; see also Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, supra 
note 23.  
26. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1992); Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right To Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487, 488 
(1999). 
27. General Comment 15, supra note 13. 
28. ESC Covenant, supra note 16, at art. 11(1). 
29. General Comment 15, supra note 13, at ¶ 3. 
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must be regarded as a necessary predicate to all other human rights. One must 
assume that if water was given any thought at all, Eleanor Roosevelt, chair of the 
committee that drafted the 1948 Universal Declaration, together with her 
committee, simply took for granted that everyone would have access to water of 
sufficient quantity and quality to sustain life. With governmental programs of 
deprivation and extermination recently posing the most serious threats to human 
security, water was probably simply not on the Committee’s radar screen. 
In 2010, both the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Human Rights 
Council adopted resolutions recognizing the human right to water.30 This would 
appear on its face to signal the coming of age of the right. But the votes on these 
proposals were not unanimous; abstaining from the General Assembly resolution, 
for example, were such important donor countries as Canada, Denmark, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.31 And 
statements made by delegations in explanation of their votes in the General 
Assembly made clear that several rich countries, including the United States, did 
not accept the idea of a human right to water.32 Whether this was merely a bump 
in the road of the right’s evolution or an impassible obstacle, only time will tell. 
But more fundamentally, the failure of a number of important rich countries to 
accept the right when given a clear opportunity to do so is facially puzzling: is 
this a matter of principle—e.g., that the process of formation of a norm of 
customary international law has not matured sufficiently—or is it borne of a 
concern that these countries’ practices will be held up to a scrutiny that they fear, 
or that they are concerned that, morally if not legally, recognition of the right 
would cause them to feel pressure to direct large sums of foreign assistance to the 
alleviation of problems of clean water supply? Regardless of the explanation, the 
failure of universal acceptance of the right is at least a bump in the road of the 
right’s evolution. The bottom line, then, is that the existence of a human right to 
water, even though acknowledged in United Nations documents, cannot yet be 
taken for granted. 
 
30. G.A. Res. A/64/292, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 29, 2010); H.R.C Res. 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/15/L.14. (Sept. 24, 2010). 
31. Stephen C. McCaffrey, International Water Cooperation in the 21st Century: Recent Developments in 
the Law of International Watercourses, 23 RECIEL 4, 9 (2014) [hereinafter McCaffrey RECIEL] (“Unless a 
vote is called for, a resolution of this kind would ordinarily be adopted by consensus, without a vote. However, 
the United States called for a vote on the resolution, which led to its adoption by a vote of 122 in favour, none 
against and 41 abstentions. Abstaining were a number of significant developed countries, many of which are 
major donors in the water sector, including Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States”). The expression 
“donor countries” is used to refer to countries providing development assistance to countries in need, including 
assistance with respect to water projects. 
32. Press Release, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation 
as Human Right, by Recorded Vote of 122 in Favour, None against, 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release 
GA/10967 (July 28, 2010) available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/ga10967.doc.htm (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release] (containing excerpts from the 
explanations of vote by Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
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V. REALIZATION OF THE RIGHT 
A. Progressive vs. Immediate Implementation 
Despite the uncertainties just discussed, it will be assumed for the purposes 
of the present discussion that a human right to water is generally accepted, and 
that the content of the right corresponds with that described in General Comment 
15: namely, that everyone is entitled to “sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically 
accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.”33 We may now 
return to the earlier discussion of whether the right must be implemented 
immediately, or whether progressive implementation, in accordance with a 
country’s capabilities, is sufficient. It seems clear that General Comment 15 sees 
the right to water as falling within the economic, social, and cultural rights 
category, since it was derived from Articles 11 and 12 of the ESC Covenant.34 
This would make it subject to progressive implementation “to the maximum of [a 
state’s] available resources.”35 
But in General Comment 15, the ESC Committee identified a number of 
“core obligations” relating to the right to water, which were effective 
immediately. The Committee explains as follows: 
In General Comment No. 3, the Committee confirms that States parties 
have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights enunciated in the 
Covenant. In the Committee’s view, at least a number of core obligations 
in relation to the right to water can be identified, which are of immediate 
effect.36 
The Committee proceeds to identify no less than nine core obligations, which 
seem to make up the essence of the right. The first three, for purposes of 
illustration, are the following: 
a. To ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is 
sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease; 
b. To ensure the right of access to water, and water facilities and 
services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged 
or marginalized groups; 
 
33. General Comment 15, supra note 13, at ¶ 3. 
34. Id. at ¶ 1. 
35. ESC Covenant, supra note 16, at art. 2(1). 
36. General Comment 15, supra note 13, at ¶ 37. 
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c. To ensure physical access to water facilities or services that provide 
sufficient, safe and regular water; have a sufficient number of water 
outlets to avoid prohibitive waiting times; are at a reasonable 
distance from the household. 37 
One may wonder whether the concept of core obligations is not being used 
here as a way of converting ESC obligations into CP obligations that are subject 
to immediate implementation. In any event, it is clear that merely calling them 
“core obligations” will not make it any easier for developing countries, in 
particular, to implement them. In an apparent attempt to address this problem, the 
ESC Committee, in effect, shifts the burden onto donor countries and institutions: 
For the avoidance of any doubt, the Committee wishes to emphasize that 
it is particularly incumbent on States parties and other actors in a position 
to assist, to provide international assistance and cooperation, especially 
economic and technical which enables developing countries to fulfill 
their core obligations.38 
There is no question that the international donor community and certain 
countries, in particular, wish to assist developing countries in ensuring that 
everyone has access to sufficient water to meet their needs.39 A number of such 
programs have been in progress since long before the ESC Committee adopted 
General Comment 15.40 These efforts will no doubt continue regardless of the 
legal nature of the Committee’s statements, and, indeed, of General Comment 15 
itself. But it seems equally clear that the ESC Committee does not have the 
authority to adopt binding comments or, a fortiori, to impose immediate 
obligations on states parties to the ESC Covenant, whether developed or 
developing, much less on states that are not parties to this agreement.41 Instead, 
the Committee has the capacity to issue authoritative, though non-binding, 
interpretations of the covenant, and will presumably draw on these concepts in 
evaluating reports submitted by states parties on their implementation of the 
obligations under the ESC Covenant.42 
 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at ¶ 38. 
39. See Stephen C. McCaffrey & Kate J. Neville, Small Capacity and Big Responsibilities: Financial and 
Legal Implications of a Human Right to Water for Developing Countries, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 
685 (2009). 
40. Id. 
41. See discussion supra Part IV. 
42. See General Comment 15, supra note 13, at art. 21. 
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B. Mismatches 
As discussed elsewhere, the emergence of the human right to water has 
brought out some rather striking mismatches.43 There are two in particular that 
will be noted here. The first is the mismatch between capacity and 
responsibilities: actually implementing a human right to water for everyone 
within a state’s borders is a tall order, indeed—and, as discussed below, not only 
for developing countries. And the second is the mismatch between many of the 
countries that have accepted the right, and their level of development. 
Little needs to be added to what has already been said concerning the first 
mismatch. It seems clear that the obligation to guarantee a human right to water 
must be one that is implemented progressively, within the limits of a country’s 
available resources. Unfortunately, there is no light switch that can be flipped to 
suddenly make water available to those who lack access to it. Research has 
confirmed, on the basis of a large database, the unsurprising proposition that a 
country’s “acceptance of HRW [the human right to water] ‘by itself may not help 
the poor to gain access to water and thus is not a magic bullet.’”44 Yet this seems 
to be an assumption that is implicit in the idea of core obligations as indicated 
above. 
While significant progress has been made on achieving the MDG of reducing 
the number of people without access to safe drinking water by half, as noted 
earlier, some 700 million people remain without such access; and related to this 
problem, is that around a billion people still lack basic sanitation.45 It seems likely 
that the progress made thus far on water and sanitation concerns cases of what 
might be called low-hanging fruit—i.e., those issues that are less challenging to 
address. If this is true, progress on the remaining cases will inevitably be slower. 
But regardless of the difficulty of making progress on the provision of water and 
sanitation, the extent to which it is achieved will necessarily depend to a large 
degree on the resources the international donor community is able to bring to 
bear. The irony here, to be discussed next, is that even some of the world’s 
richest countries have problems of their own concerning the provision of access 
to safe drinking water. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe 
drinking water and sanitation is reported to have found on a visit to California, 
whose economy is in the top ten globally, that over 250,000 residents, most of 
whom were poor, lacked access to safe water and had to purchase bottled water.46 
 
43. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 39, at 680; McCaffrey RECIEL, supra note 31, at 9–11. 
44. Norbert Brunner et al., The Human Right to Water in Law and Implementation, 4 LAWS 417, 427 
(2015) (quoting P.B. Anand, Right to Water and Access to Water, 19 J. INT’L DEV. 511–26 (2007)). 
45. WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNICEF, supra note 5, at 6. 
46. See Dan Bacher, Governor Brown Signs Human Right to Water Bill, INDYBAY (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2012/09/26/18722446.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review).  
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Turning to the second mismatch, it has already been noted that some of the 
world’s richest countries—first and foremost the United States—have yet to 
accept the existence of a human right to water.47 This position is to be contrasted 
with the acceptance of the right by many countries in the developing world. A 
recent comprehensive study found that fifty-two countries, with a total 
population of some four and a half billion people, have accepted the human right 
to water and sanitation in their constitutions, laws, or policies.48 What is striking 
about this finding is not so much the number of states, or even their aggregate 
population, but rather the fact that nearly all of these states are developing: they 
comprise almost all of Central and South America and South Asia, and much of 
Africa. In Europe, the U.K., France, Hungary and Sweden seem to be the only 
accepting states.49 In North America, the state of California stands out as the only 
political unit that has accepted the right.50 
This is striking, especially since the extensive data compiled in the study 
indicates that the right is treated in practice as being subject to progressive 
realization, meaning that even developed countries would not have to implement 
it immediately, as long as they were pursuing its implementation in good faith. 
Moreover, “case-law confirmed that the progressive realization of HRW is 
meant, without giving individuals a specific right for the delivery of water 
services with certain characteristics as to quantum, quality, or costs.”51 It seems 
odd that even with this flexibility, a number of leading rich countries have yet to 
embrace the human right to water.52 In the case of the United States, at least part 
of the explanation may have to do with the relative litigiousness of its society. 
California’s governor cited possible lawsuits based on the right as a reason for 
his veto of earlier HRW legislation.53 
But in general, some states will continue to insist on strict compliance with 
the requirements for the establishment of a new norm of customary international 
law—i.e., a general practice, accepted as law—in order to recognize the human 
right to water as a customary norm.54 After all, its genesis lies entirely in non-
binding instruments—resolutions of the General Assembly and the Human 
Rights Council, and General Comment 15, adopted by the Committee on 
 
47. U.N. Press Release, supra note 32. 
48. Brunner et al., supra note 44, at 414. 
49. See id. at 415. 
50. McCaffrey RECIEL, supra note 31, at 10. 
51. Brunner et al., supra note 47, at 438, 448; see, e.g., Lindiwe Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2009 
Case CCT 39/09, ZACC 28,  at 9 para. 19 (S. Afr.)  
52. See supra notes 31 and 32 and accompanying text. 
53. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gov. of the State of Cal., Governor’s Veto Message to AB 1242, 2009–2010 
Leg. Sess., (Oct. 12, 2009), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?Bill 
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. For all the attention the right has received 
in U.N. documents, scholarly literature, and domestic case law, it still must be 
recognized as a new, universally binding human right, either by an authoritative 
and generally recognized source, such as the International Court of Justice, or by 
states generally. Since the former has not occurred, and some states that play 
important roles in the international system have yet to accept the existence of the 
right, the conclusion must be that it has not yet emerged as a norm of customary 
international law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This short paper has considered the relatively recent emergence of the 
concept of a human right to water against the background of the decreasing per 
capita availability of fresh water and the little assistance afforded by the notion of 
water as property. It has shown that the notion of a right to water emerged largely 
from non-binding documents adopted within the context of the United Nations, 
and that there does not yet appear to be a consensus among states on the 
existence of the right as a matter of customary international law. Finally, the 
paper has examined issues relating to the implementation of the right, concluding 
that to the extent that it exists, the right to water need only be implemented 
progressively, and is thus not of immediate effect, as suggested by the Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
 
